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ABSTRACT
Many existing tools perform validation of high dependability computers. These tools
have focused mainly on creating an environment to support direct fault injection. Less effort
has been directed toward investigation of the relationship between performance and depend-
ability. This thesis studies this relationship by creating a tool (FTAPE) that integrates a
high stress workload generator with fault injection and by using the tool to evaluate system
performance under error conditions.
The workloads are comprised of processes which are formed from atomic components
that represent CPU, memory, and I/O activity. The fault injector is software-implemented
and is capable of injecting any memory-addressable location, including special registers and
caches.
This tool has been used to study a Tandem Integrity $2 computer. Workloads with
varying numbers of processes and varying compositions of CPU, memory, and I/O activity
are first characterized in terms of performance. Then faults are injected into these workloads.
The results show that as the number of concurrent processes increases, the mean fault latency
initially increases due to increased contention for the CPU. However, for even higher numbers
of processes (> 3 processes), the mean latency decreases because long latency faults are paged
out before they can be activated.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The validation of fault-tolerant computer systemsis an important issue becausethe
dependability of these computers must be ascertainedbefore use in critical applications.
Presently, a common method of validating computer prototypes is through fault injec-
tion. Many fault injection studies have been reported in the literature. The studies in-
clude radiation-based,hardware-implemented,and software-implementedapproachesto in-
ject faults. Theseefforts concentratemainly on inventing a better method of performing
fault injection.
However,an issuethat hasnot receivedmuchattention is the relationship betweenper-
formance and dependability, which are determined not only by the system but also by the
workload. In order to effectivelyevaluatea fault-tolerant system, the system must be op-
erated with workloads that stressboth the functionality and modulesin the system under
high stress conditions. Faults must be injected under such workloads to evaluate the full
potential of the various fault-tolerant mechanisms.If the part of the system that is faulty
is not stressedadequately,then the propagation of the fault will appear to be less than it
would be under high stress. Contrastingly, if the workload utilizes all parts of the system,
then the full potential of the fault will be realized.
This thesispresentsatool that is ableto createworkloadsthat canstressthe test machine
in various ways. A synthetic workload generator is usedto obtain high controllability and
flexibility. This workload generator is integrated along with a fault injector to produce
the Fault-Tolerance and PerformanceEvaluator (FTAPE), a tool that can study jointly
both performanceand dependability. The workload is able to send to the fault injector
information, suchas where in memory the workload is current executing. This information
is used to select fault types and locations. The generatedworkloads consist of processes,
which are createdby combiningatomic componentsthat representCPU, memory, and I/O
activity. Eachworkload is specifiedby the numberand types of processes,and eachprocess
is characterizedby the compositionand sequenceof atomic components.
A software-implementedfault injector is usedin this study. Software-implemented fault
injection (SWIFI) uses software to corrupt memory and registers. SWIFI is cheaper and
easier to use than hardware-implemented methods since no additional hardware is needed.
Communication is also easier since the injection routines can be reprogrammed to take
advantage of dynamic data, such as that sent by the workload. SWIFI can also be used to
emulate the effect of hardware faults [1].
FTAPE has been implemented and used on a Tandem Integrity $2 computer. Exper-
iments were performed using workloads which (1) varied in CPU, memory, and I/O com-
position and (2) varied in the number of concurrent processes. The workloads were first
characterized through the use of performance measurements to demonstrate their CPU,
memory, and I/O nature. Then, the same fault w_s repeatedly injected into these workloads.
to showthat different propagationpaths result from different workloads. Theseexperiments
are repeated, with the exception that the faults are injected into the entire workload, in
order to study the dependability characteristics,suchas error detection coverageand fault
latency, in relation to the entire workload.
The remainderof this thesisis organizedasfollows: Chapter 2 hasa summary of related
work. A detailed description of FTAPE, including the test machine,can be found in Chap-
ter 3. Chapter 4 presents the characterization of the workloads used in the experiments, and
Chapter 5 describes the experiments. Conclusions and directions for future work are given
in Chapter 6.
2. RELATED WORK
Much work has already been done in the area of fault-tolerant system evaluation. The
methods utilized have included simulation, trace-based simulation, physical fault injection,
and SWIFI. This thesis uses the SWIFI approach.
Among the simulation-based studies is Iyer [2], in which error propagation from the gate
to the chip level was investigated. FOCUS [3], [4] is a tool that conducts fault sensitivity
analysis of chip-level designs through the use of circuit-level and logic-level simulation. DE-
PEND [5], [6] creates a simulation environment to study system-level effects of faults. An
instruction-level simulation is used to perform fault injection in [7]. These simulation-based
approaches are very flexible, but they do not reflect the effects of system components not
included in the simulation model.
Trace-based simulation differs from pure simulation by making use of data traces from
actual machines. In [8], the memory of large computer systems was periodically sampled by
a hardware monitor. A similar method was used to study a shared-memory multiprocessor
in [9]. A hybrid monitor approach was used in [10] to investigate a TI Explorer II Lisp
5machine. Unfortunately, due to memory limitations, traces are limited in the amount of
information they can contain.
Physical fault injection involves physically perturbing a system through some hardware
means. In [11], heavy-ion radiation was used as a method of fault injection. Experiments
involving FTMP [12], [13], [14] use fault-injection implants between chips and sockets to
create pin-level faults. In [15], MESSALINE introduces faults by using active probes which
inject current onto a pin, as well as implants between chips and sockets. These physical
hardware approaches are either not easily controllable, or not very flexible.
An alternative to the physical fault injection approach is the SWIFI approach. Instead of
using hardware to inject faults, software is used. More control over injections is gained, but
a certain overhead is incurred. FIAT is an automated environment developed at Carnegie
Mellon University [7], [16]. Faults were injected into IBM RT workstations, and an analysis
of runs with and without injections was performed. Another automated fault-injection ap-
proach is FERRARI, which is described in [17]. FERRARI utilizes software traps to inject
transient faults, in addition to permanent faults.
The environment used in this study is a hybrid monitor-based environment [18]. A hybrid
environment combines the flexibility and utility of SWIFI with the low intrusiveness of a
hardware/software monitor. Past SWIFI implementations, such as FIAT and FERRARI,
have relied on instrumenting user applications. The fault injection facility on the Tandem
Integrity $2 requires no modification of the application. Moreover, previous studies have
limited the location of faults to user space because the test machines were not designed to
tolerate certain faults.
Researchon workloadgenerationhasfocusedon threemethods: trace data, benchmarks,
and synthetic programs. The method selectedin this thesisis the useof synthetic programs.
The main advantageof usingtrace data to generate workloads is an accurate represen-
tation of an actual workload. An example in which trace data of usage in a file system were
used to perform experiments on file system cache sizes is found in [19]. The disadvantages of
using trace data include large data files and difficulty in using the data on different machines
or in modifying the data to alter the workload. These problems are not characteristic of
benchmarks.
Benchmarks are relatively short programs or scripts that are designed to model real
workloads. They are easily portable to other machines and can be modified by simply
changing the input parameters. Some examples of benchmarks are found in [20], which
measured the performance of three UNIX systems, and in [21], which compared the Sun
NFS with the Andrew file system. The main criticism of benchmarks is that they do not
represent real workloads.
Synthetic programs attempt to combine the advantages of trace data and benchmarks by
adding parameters that can be adjusted to reflect real workloads. A discussion of synthetic
workload design methods can be found in [22]. A few studies using synthetic workloads are
found in [23], [24], and [25], which used synthetic workloads to model a file update process.
Much of the previous work concerning synthetic workload generation involves workload
characterization. In the literature, workload characterization usually refers to the extraction
of parameters describing a representative workload, which can then be used to form proba-
bilistic models. These models can then be solved to evaluate the performance of a computer
system under that specific workload. Ferrari [26] was the first to identify resource patterns,-
which were identified by visual inspection and clustering of two-dimensional scatter plots
representing resource usage. The clustering process was later improved by using statistical
pattern recognition techniques [27], [28].
In this thesis, workload characterization is used to measure the extent to which a workload
stresses the system (i.e., to what extent the system resources are utilized by the workload).
Although the result of the characterization is not used for modeling, a possible future use
is in the derivation of a single measure that could be used for a more direct quantitative
comparison of performance and dependability. A single measure incorporating both perfor-
mance and dependability could be used as a benchmark to compare different fault-tolerant
computers.
The major contribution of this work is relating performance to dependability. This is
accomplished through the creation and use of a synthetic workload generator in conjunction
with a fault injector. Previous studies have limited workloads to small programs which
have been chosen with little knowledge of the characteristics of those workloads. With
FTAPE, complex workloads, including multiple processes, can be created with a controllable
composition of various components. These workloads are characterized in order to obtain
u
performance information, and this information is then related to the results of fault injections
into those workloads.
83. DESCRIPTION OF FTAPE
FTAPE consistsof two main parts: the fault injector (FI) and the workload generator
(WG). An illustration of the interaction betweenthe FI and the WG is given in Figure 3.1.
The FI is started up first, and then the WG is initiated by the FI. The FI and WG obtain
input from parametersfiles, and the FI also producesa log file. To observethe propagation
of injected faults, a hybrid monitor fault injection environment wasused (seeSection 3.4).
A more detailed description of thesemain componentsis given below.
:' t. J .....
, , @ Initiate Process
I I
_ - - -_" File Input/Output
°°°..,°
I
File
Figure 3.1: Fault Injector and Workload Generator Environment
3.1 Fault Injector
The fault injector is the subprogramthat injects faults into the local memory spaceof the
$2. When first started up, it readsin a distribution of interarrival times for fault injections.
The distribution is composedof discretetimes with associatedprobabilities. This method
allows distributions that cannot be easily representedby a mathematical formula to be
specified. After reading in the interarrival times, the FI proceedsto make each injection,
which involvesXORing the contentsof the target local memory word with a user-defined
mask. The user can direct the FI to inject faults into the kernel or into a specific user
process. Additionally, injections can be targeted at the code,data, or stack segmentsof
specificprocesses.
The FI also has a single-fault mode. In this mode, a single fault is injected. The FI
then waits for a predeterminedtimeout period to elapse,during which time it checksif the
injected processorhascrashed.1 If the processorcrashesduring the timeout period, the FI
brings the processorback on-line. In any case(crashor no crash), the FI makessure that
the processoris fault-free.2 The processis then repeated.
The low-level fault injection mechanismis implementedas a devicedriver in the kernel.
The parameters for a call to the fault injection routine are the CPU to be injected, the
address,and the injection XOR mask. The actual injection consistsof XORing the contents
of that local memory location with the XOR mask. An injection into the cache can also
1Each fault-tolerant component is represented by a file in the file system. The file permissions are used
to reflect the current state of each component. Thus, a simple check of the appropriate file permissions will
determine if a component has crashed.
2if the processor previously crashed and was reintegrated, then it is fault-free. If not, then the processor
is intentionally downed and reintegrated.
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be simulated by invalidating the appropriate cache line, if the location exists in the cache.
The next access involving that cache line will force the corrupted memory contents into the
cache. If necessary, the write protection for certain parts of memory, such as the kernel, can
be temporarily disabled.
3.2 Workload Generator
The workload generator is an important part of any fault injection study. It has been
shown that the probability of a system failure is increased by greater processor activity
[29]. Also, the relationship between the probability of a CPU-related error and increased
workload activity has been established [30]. Since one of the goals of this thesis is to study
the relationship between workload performance and fault propagation, the ability to create
workloads with specific characteristics is essential.
Because the characteristics of a real program are more difficult to control, a synthetic
workload generator is chosen. Our workload generator creates composite workloads out
of components representing concentrated CPU, memory, and I/O activity. An attempt is
made to model real workloads by allowing the user tb create several types of processes and
w
to execute one or more of those types of processes. In addition, parameters for the workload
components can be specified as distributions. Workload component parameters include total
execution time, location of memory accesses (cache, local, global), and type and number of
I/O accesses. Since the workload generator is intended for use in an integrated fault-injection
environment, it should be able to communicate to the fault injector such information as the
location, size, and composition of the current workload.
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3.2.1 Processcomponents
Three types of process components (PCs) have been created:
description of each process component follows:
CPU, mem, and IO. A
CPU Additions, subtractions, multiplications, and divisions are repeatedly performed. In-
ternal CPU registers are used as much as possible, and few memory accesses are made.
The number of operations can be controlled.
mere A large array is constructed in memory, and sequential accesses are made with a
specified stride. By controlling the stride, some measure of control over the cache hit
rate is available. For example, with a stride of 0, the same array location is constantly
accessed, yielding a cache hit rate of practically 100%. A stride of 4 bytes (which is
the size of a single $2 cache line) will force a cache hit rate of almost 0%. The number
of memory accesses can be controlled.
I/O An I/O-based workload generator developed in [31] is used. Using a synthetically
generated file system, the I/0 generator initiates I/0 requests, which are handled by
the UNIX operatingsystem. The I/0 requests are made in a logical sequence (e.g.,
a file must be opened before it can be closed), and an attempt is made to model an
actual I/0 workload. The number of files which are opened, used for reads and writes,
and then closed can be controlled.
3.2.2 Workload composition methods
A workload is created by combining PCs in various ways. An example of the workload
model can be see in Figure 3.2. A sequence is a logical ordering of PCs. An instance of.
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Figure 3.2: Workload Model
a sequence is the executing image of that sequence. Thus, a sequence can be viewed as
a program stored on disk, while an instance is a single copy of that program executing in
memory. Many instances of a sequence can be started, and each instance can draw the
parameters for its PCs from a specified distribution. The interarrival time for the start of
the instances of each sequence can also be specified, as well as the start offset, which is
the time from the start of the WG to the earliest start of an instance for that sequence.
By using this sequence/instance, organization, the WG can model processes with a certain
composition of CPU, memory, and [/0 load, and many instances of these processes can be
executed.
Thus, there exist several methods to vary a workload:
1. Execution time for each PC
• Can be fixed before execution.
• Can be drawn from a specified distribution at run time.
2. Sequence of PCs
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• Can be a fixed sequence of PC types (that is repeated) determir/ed before execu-
tion.
• Exact ordering of PCs in each instance can be determined at run time and drawn
from a specified distribution.
3. Intensity of each PC
• For example, relative amount of CPU activity done by the cpu PC.
• May be fixed or drawn from a specified distribution.
4. Number of instances
• One or more of each sequence may be executed.
• Must be specified before execution.
3.3 Interaction Between FI and WG
Figure 3.1 shows the interaction between the fault injector and workload generator. The
WG is started by the FI. In order for the FI to inject faults into currently active user process
space, it must obtain all necessary process IDs (PIDs) from the WG. Once the FI receives
the PIDs, it selects one process and determines the required information (virtual location of
active pages and virtual-to-physical address translation) for fault injection.
Both the FI and WG use input parameter files to specify necessary variables and distri-
butions. The FI creates an output file that includes time-stamped lines with information
such as injection location and mask, error detection, and CPU reintegration.
14
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Figure 3.3: Physical Layout of the Hybrid Fault Injection Environment
3.4 The Hybrid Monitor-Based Environment
The hybrid environment uses a hardware monitor to obtain high time resolution and
minimize system perturbation due to event detection and logging, as well as a software
monitor to assist the fault injector. A detailed description can be found in [18].
The hardware configuration consists of a hardware monitor, a target system, and a control
host. The physical layout is given in Figure 3.3.
The target machine is the Tandem $2, which is described in Section 3.5. The hardware
monitor is a Tektronix DAS9200 Logic Analyzer (DAS), which has probes attached to the
local processor bus on one of the S2's processor boards. Acquired data recorded by the DAS
include addresses, data, read/write signals, interrupts, and DMA signals. The control host
is a Sun ELC workstation.
The fault injector and workload execute on the $2. In addition, a supervisor program
communicates with the fault injector and workload and uses that information to reprogram
the DAS. This reprogramming is accomplished by the assistant program on the Sun. The
assistant program receives commands from the supervisor program over the local Ethernet.
This configuration allows the DAS to dynamically reconfigure itself to adjust to changing
conditions on the target machine.
15
3.5 The Tandem Integrity $2
The Integrity $2 is a fault-tolerant computer designedby Tandem. An in-depth descrip-
tion canbe found in [32],and a basicoverviewof the architecture is givenin Figure 3.4. The
$2 is UNIX-based (SVR3) and usesthe MIPS R2000microprocessor.The coreof the $2 is
its triple-modular-redundant processors.Eachprocessorincludes a CPU, a cache,and an
8MB local memory. Although these three processorsperform the samework, they operate
independently of eachother until they needto accessthe doubly replicated global memory.
The local processormemory is not parity-protected. Fault detection is performed by the
duplexedTriple Modular RedundantControllers (TMRCs) voterswhich areactivated when-
ever the global memory is accessed.If an error is found, the faulty processoris shut down,
and immediately undergoesa Power-OnSelf-Test (POST). Upon passing the POST, the
processoris reintegrated into the systemby copying the states of the two good processors.
Voting alsooccurson all I/O and interrupts.
The processorsare looselysynchronized-- they operate independently until TMRC vot-
ing occurs. In order to synchronizethe processors,at every2047instructions eachprocessor
is stalled until all other processorsarrive at the samesynchronizationpoint or a timeout is
reached. If the timeout is reached,the appropriate processoris declaredfaulty and reinte-
grated.
In addition to these fault detection mechanisms,the local memory is scrubbedperiodi-
cally. If a fault is discovered,a soft DMA error correction is performed without a POST or
16
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Figure 3.4: Overview of Tandem Integrity $2 Architecture
reintegration. This fault-tolerant architecture ensures that a fault that occurs on one pro-
cessor will not propagate to other system components without being caught by the TMRC
voting process.
17
4. WORKLOAD CHARACTERIZATION
The workloads used in the experiments in Chapter 5 are characterized in this section.
In this thesis, workload characterization refers to using real measurements to obtain the
performance characteristics of a workIoad. In this way, the effect of faults on the performance
of a specific workload can be measured.
The specification of the workload is done in terms of how much of the composite workload
is constituted by a particular type of process component. For example, a workload that
consists of 20% cpu, 40% mem, and 40% io PC would be notated as having a 20/40/40
composition. The number of such processes in the workload also has to be specified. The
following two types of analyses are used for workload characterization:
1. Gather process statistics that are kept by the operating system. On the $2, which runs
SVR3, the timex command is used. (See Section 4.1.) Only the target workload and
the OS should be running.
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2. Do an instruction-level profile of the workload and determine the ra;tio of load-store
instructions to nonload-store instructions. The cpu PC should be mostly nonload-store
instructions, while the mem PC should be mostly load-store instructions.
These two types of analyses are described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
4.l OS Statistics
Most operating systems keep track of some performance statistics. The version of SVR3
implemented on the $2 includes the t imex command, which monitors performance statistics
for one process (including its children). The workloads used in the experiments described
later were executed using the timex command. The results of the timex command for some
of these workloads are given in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The definition of each statistic can be
found in Table 4.3. It was found that the results for workload execution times of 20, 60, and
120 minutes were the same. Therefore, the measurements in this section were performed on
workloads that ran for 20 minutes each. The overhead due to the timex command is minimal
since it merely extracts statistics that the operating system normally updates. Also, this
data extraction is only performed once the workload has finished.
Each succeeding workload for workloads A through E is less I/O-intensive and more
memory-intensive than the previous workload. Table 4.1 shows that this is indeed the case.
The CPU composition is kept the same in order to relate any observed change in results
to the relative mem and io composition. The amount of wait time due to blocked I/O
(% wio), the disk busy time (% busy), and the number of system calls per second (syscall/s)
all decrease because the number of disk requests decreases. The average disk request queue
19
Table 4.1: PerformanceStatistics for SelectedWorkloads
Workloads
A I B I C l D [ E
#processes I I I i i
% cpu PC 20 20 20 20 20
% mem PC 0 20 40 60 80
% io PC 80 60 40 20 0
% usr 47 65 78 90 99
% sys 34 22 14 6 1
% wio 19 13 8 4 0
% busy 20 13 9 4 0
avque 1.3 1.3 1.6 2.1 7.0
avwait 9.5 12.7 20.3 38.2 133.7
syscall/s 177 158 105 44 10
pswch/s 20 17 15 13 ll
runq-sz 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
% runocc 79 84 91 95 100
Table 4.2: Performance Statistics for Selected Workloads
Workloads
F G H I J
#processes 1 2 3 5 10
% cpu PC 20 20 20 20 20
% _em PC 40 40 40 40 40
% io PC 40 40 40 40 40
% usr 77 80 81 80 82
% sys 15 17 18 18 17
% wio 8 3 1 1 1
% busy 8 8 9 8 7
avque 1.4 1.6 2.6 2.6 2.9
avwait 13.5 21.6 52.5 54.0 63.1
syscall/s 107 103 104 101 93
pswch/s 16 20 20 22 23
runq-sz 1.0 2.0 2.9 4.9 9.7
% runocc 91 97 99 99 99
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Table 4.3: Meaning of PerformanceStatistics
#processes
% cpu PC
% mem PC
% io PC
% usr
% sys
% wio
% busy
avque
avwait
syscall/s
pswch/s
runq-sz
% runocc
How many concurrent processes in the workload
% of the total workload represented by the cpu PC
% of the total workload represented by the rnern PC
% of the total workload represented by the io PC
% of CPU time running in user mode
% of CPU time running in system mode
% of CPU time waiting for blocked I/O
% of time disk was busy servicing a request
outstanding number of disk requests while disk is busy
average time in milliseconds requests wait in queue
system calls per second
process switches per second
average run queue length while occupied
% of time run queue was occupied
length and wait time (avque and avwait) are only updated when the disk is busy. Both avque
and avwait increase because these numbers are influenced more and more by the intense disk
activity needed at the beginning to load the process image.
Each succeeding workload for workloads F through J has more processes than the previous
workload. Table 4.2 shows the effects of increased process concurrency. The average wait
time due to blocked I/O (% wio) decreases since other processes can use the CPU while a
process is blocked for I/O.'rhe average disk request queue length and wait time (avque and
avwait) increase because while one process is blocked for I/O, another process will execute
until it is blocked for I/O. This process is repeated for additional processes. Thus, a higher
level of process concurrency results in more processes being blocked for I/O at the same
time. The number of process switches (pswch/s), the average run queue length (runq_sz),
and the percentage of time the run queue is occupied (% runocc) all increase as expected.
2i
4.2 Load-Store Instruction Ratio
t
The three available types of PCs (epu, mem, and io) can be viewed in terms of the
amount of the resultant data flow. Since instruction fetches occur independently of the
workload composition, the focus should be on noninstruction data flow. The $2 is based on
the MIPS R2000, which is a load-store architecture processor. Data only enter or leave the
R2000 when a load-store instruction is executed. Thus, the ratio of load-store instructions
to total instructions is a measure of the amount of data flow in and out of the CPU.
Some expectations can be formed about the load-store instruction ratio (LSIR) for each
type of PC. The cpu PC is supposed to contain mostly CPU-intensive activity. Thus, the
cpu PC should have a very low LSIR, i.e., most instructions should be register-to-register
instructions. The mem PC should produce a great deal of memory activity and, therefore,
should have a high LSIR. It is not obvious what LSIR the io PC should have because most
of the data flow is performed via DMA. Table 4.4 shows the measured LSIRs for several
workloads.
The LSIR is a dynamic count of load-store instructions which are executed. It was
obtained by profiling each" workload for one hour. Since the profiling uses sampling, the
resultant LSIR measure is approximate. The profiling is also only performed for addresses
within the workload memory image and does not include kernel routines.
The data in Table 4.4 are split into two groups of workloads. The first group (cpu_wkld,
mem_wkld, io_wkld) consists entirely of one PC type. The second group (A,... ,E) uses a
combination of several PC types. The very low LSIR (0.20%) for the cpu_wkld workload
confirms the expectation that the cpu PC consists mostly of register-to-register instructions.
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Table 4.4: MeasuredLSIRs for SomeWorkloads
Name
cpu_wkld
Composition
% cpu, l,,,_ mem ]% io
100 0 0
0
Load-Store
%
0.20_,
mem_wkld 0 100 49.627c
io_wkld 0 0 100 9.23_,
E
A 20 0 80 5.85_
B 20 20 60 19.09_
C 20 40 40 28.44_
D 20 60 20 34.35_
41.08_20 80 0
The relatively high LSIR (49.62%) for the mem_wkld workload shows that the mem PC has
a much higher mix of instructions which access memory. The LSIR for the io_wkld workload
(9.23%) is not very high. The low LSIR can be explained by examining the programming
structures used to construct the three basic types of PCs. The cpu PC consists of many
arithmetic operations within a tight loop. Similarly, the mere PC performs memory accesses
within a tight loop. In contrast, the io PC performs system calls within a large switch()
statement and thus contains many nonload-store instructions to manage the control flow
within the switch() statement.
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5. EXPERIMENTS
The following experiments were performed to show the relationship between performance
(represented by the workload) and dependability (represented by the error coverages and
fault latencies). In Section 5.1, the same fault (same fault type and location) is injected
many times into different workloads to show that the propagation path of a fault can be
altered just by changing the workload. Section 5.2 repeats the same experiments, but with
faults randomly injected into the entire workload.
All fault injections in this section are single-bit flip faults in the local processor memory.
Since the local memory is not parity-protected, single-bit flip faults will not be detected until
the faulted location is accessed.
5.1 Propagation Paths
In this section, a single fault is injected into different workloads to demonstrate that the
generated workloads affect the propagation paths of the faults. Two different fault scenarios
are presented.
24
5.1.1 Fault 1
In this example, five different workloads with varying amounts of the mem and io PC
are used. Each workload has one process.
Workloads:
Fault:
Results:
Workloads A-E. (See Section 4.1.).
Inject into mem PC text space. A reserved instruction exception is
generated, which results in an error detection when the interrupt is
presented to the voter.
Table 5.1 shows that as the mem PC is accessed more often, the mean
fault latencies decrease. This is as expected. Since the mem PC is
not used in workload A, the faults injected into it are not accessed
and therefore do not cause any error detections.
Table 5.1: Fault 1 Results
Workload Errors
Name Detected
A 2O 0 8O 0
B 20 20 60 100
C 20 40 4O 100
D 2O 6O 2O 100
E 20 8O 0 100
Composition
cpu ] % mem I _ io
Faults
Injected
100
100
100
100
100
%
Detected
o %
100 %
100 %
100 %
lOO %
Latency
(sac)
2.40±0.73 l
0.97±0.21
0.49±0.13
0.20±0.05
5.1.2 Fault 2
A fault may be paged out if memory is being fully utilized. In this case, the page will
simply be invalidated if it is in text space. If it is in data space, then a dirty page will
be written to global memory, causing an error detection. In this experiment, the effect of
increasing process concurrency is investigated.
Workloads: Workloads F-J. (See Section 4.1.).
l All intervals in this thesis are 95% confidence intervals.
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Fault:
Results:
Inject into cpu PC text space. A reserved instruction exception is
generated, which results in an error detection when the interrupt is
presented to the voter.
Table 5.2 shows the effects of a workload with multiple
concurrent processes. As the level of concurrency increases, the
number of faults that are paged out increases, thus decreasing the
overall error detection percentage. Also, the mean latency of the
faults increases initially because the injected location is accessed
less frequently due to contention for the CPU. However, as more
processes are added, longer latency faults are corrected by being paged
out.
Table 5.2: Fault 2 Results
Workload # Errors Faults Latency
secName Processes Detected Injected ()
F
G
H
I
J
1
2
3
5
10
150
150
140
106
61
150
150
150
150
150
% #
Detected Paged Out
100 % 0
100 % 0
93.3 % 10
70.7 % 44
40.7 % 89
3.46-+-0.79
6.75+ 1.28
8.00±1.84
6.374-1.59
2.23±0.93
5.2 Multiple Fault Results
The workloads from the'previous section are used again. However, instead of injecting the
same fault type and location, a random fault type and location are chosen for each injection.
The fault types are all single-bit flip faults, and the locations are selected from the active
regions of the workload text region. The active regions are the portions of memory that the
workload uses most often. Injections are confined to the active regions in order to increase
the probability of accessing an injected fault. If the fault location is chosen from the entire
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workload text space,then error detection coverageswill be decreasedproportionately, and
fault latencieswould remainthe same.
5.2.1 Experiment 1: varying composition
In the first case,five workloads consistingof a gradually increasing amount of mem
and a decreasingamount of io are compared. A constant amount of cpu is used for all
workloads.2 The detection ratios and fault latency distributions are given in Table 5.3 and
Figures 5.1(a)-5.1(e), respectively.
Table 5.3: Detection Ratios
Workload Composition Errors Faults %
Name % cpu ] % mem 1% io Detected Injected Detected
A 20 r0 80 137 352 38.9
B 20 20 60 160 346 46.2
C 20 40 40 185 347 53.3
D 20 60 20 174 353 49.2
E 20 80 0 162 350 46.3
Table 5.3 showsthat the highestdetectionratio occurswhenthe workload is most evenly
balanced among the three types of PCs. Since all components are evenly accessedin a
balancedworkload, the detection ratio is high. When the workload is unbalanced,certain
parts are less frequently accessed,which decreasesthe detection ratio. The range of the
detection ratios is not large, since fault injection is confined to the active regions. This
meansthat whenthe mere or io PC is not used,no faults will be injected into those areas.
If the samefault injection regionhad been usedfor all five workloads, then the detection
2Ifall threetypesofPCshadbeenvaried,thenit wouldhavebeenunclearwhichPCvariationhadcaused
thechangein results.
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Figure 5.1: Fault Latency Distributions
ratios for the unbalanced workloads (workloads A and E) would have been dramatically
smaller.
In Figures 5.1(a)-5.1(e), the fault latency distributions are given for the five workloads.
Examination of the distributions shows that the presence of the io PC produces a long tail.
The distribution for workload E contains no such tail. Furthermore, as the contribution of
the mere PC increases, the distributions shift to the left.
This phenomenon can be explained in two ways. First, since disk accesses are always
slower than memory accesses, the latencies for I/O-bound processes should be longer. An-
other reason for this effect is the control flow structure of each PC. The cpu and mem PCs
are both tight loops, in which the instructions in. the loops are executed many times. The
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io PC is different. It consistsof a large switch statement that is executed inside a loop.
Most instructions in the io PC are located within the switch statement, which means that
those instructions are not executed each time through the loop. Thus, the time from when
the fault is injected to when it is accessed is longer if the io PC is used. The first access
time is the time between the time of fault injection and the first time the faulted location is
accessed by a read, write, or page out. The average first access time for all workloads is less
than 2 seconds.
5.2.2 Experiment 2: concurrent processes
In this experiment with multiple faults, the number of processes was varied from 1 to
10. Each process was composed of 20% cpu PC, 40% mem PC, and 40% io PC. Table 5.4
shows the error detection ratios, mean fault latencies and page-out rates for each workload.
There are some differences with single faults between the effects seen here and in Section 5.1.
In this experiment, the detection ratios are all lower since faults are injected into the entire
workload, which includes some locations that are seldom accessed. The mean latencies are
similar to those observed in Section 5.1.
The similarity to results observed with a single fault (Section 5.1) is that as the level
of process concurrency increases, the error detection ratio decreases, and the mean fault
latency increases. This is an expected result, since the time given to each process by the
CPU decreases as the number of processes increases. This results in a longer time to first
access and hence larger fault latency. Also, more faults are paged out as the number of
processes increases, thus decreasing the error detection ratio.
29
Table 5.4: Resultsfor Concurrent Processes
Workload
Name
#
Processes
Errors
Detected
Faults
Injected
%
Detected
Paged Out
# %
o 0.0%
Mean Fault
Latency (sec)
F 1 108 229 47.2 3.79+2.99
G 2 114 234 48.7 0 0.0°_ 6.02+3.85
H 3 103 230 44.8 59 25.7(_ 7.85+1.86
82
9O
85
10
193
231
197
191
194
192
2O5
53
42.5 101 52.3°_ 9.60-t-3.95
39.0 128 55.4_ 7.99+5.43
43.2
27.8
106 53.8°_
132 69.1°_
5O
62
5.72+1.72
4.93+1.73
25.8 138 71.1_ 3.23+1.23
32.9 122 63.5_ 5.04+1.93
46 22.4 151 73.7°_ 4.74-t-1.83
3O
6. CONCLUSIONS
This thesispresentedastudy of the relationshipbetweenthe performanceand dependabil-
ity of fault-tolerant computers.To perform this study, a synthetic workload generator/fault
injector tool (FTAPE) was developed. FTAPE allowed the user under controlled condi-
tions to stressthe test machinein terms of both workloadsand fault injections. The hybrid
monitor-basedenvironment wasusedon the TandemIntegrity $2 computer to perform the
actual experiments.
Workload characterizationwasfirst performedto extract the performancecharacteristics
of a particular workload. Then faults were injected into those workloads to obtain the
dependability measures(error detection coverageand fault latency) for thoseworkloads.
Comparing the effectsof different workloads on the propagation path of a single fault
showedthat the workload could be generatedin a controllablemanner to affect the injected
fault. Injections into the entire workload showedthat balanced workloads have slightly
higher error detection ratios. It wasalsoshownthat the effect of increasingthe number of
concurrent processeshas two effects: (1) the mean fault latency initially increaseddue to
competition for the CPU and later decreaseddue to the paging out of long latency faults,
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and (2) the error detectioncoveragedecreasedbecausesomefaults werepagedout, and thus
were correctedbeforepropagating.
There are many directions for future work. Perhapsa single compositemeasureof the
workload performancecan be used. The workload characterization can also be performed
after eachfault injection in order to better understand the effect of the fault on the perfor-
mance of the workload. The workload generator and the PCs it uses may be improved. The
fault injector can also be extended to inject into global memory, multiple processors, and the
I/O system. A long-term goal is to perform this study on another fault-tolerant architecture,
not only to measure the performance of the machines, but also to make a comparative study.
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